a2acrpt

A2A-SDL

A2A-SDL is a production-oriented reference implementation of a self-describing agent-to-agent protocol with strict envelope validation, deterministic encoding, and optional cryptographic security.

Published package: https://pypi.org/project/a2acrpt/ (current release: 0.2.1)

Project Status

• Protocol version: v1
• Wire specification: docs/protocol-v1.md
• Package name: a2acrpt
• Python: >=3.11
• Scope: secure messaging envelopes and transport bindings (HTTP/WS/IPC), not a full agent platform

Core Capabilities

• Envelope validation with strict limits (max_bytes, max_depth, max_array_len, trace hop enforcement)
• Canonical JSON encoding and optional canonical CBOR
• Schema descriptors (embedded or URI) with hash verification
• Security primitives: Ed25519 signatures, X25519 + ChaCha20-Poly1305 encryption
• Replay protection backends: in-memory, SQLite, Redis
• Secure policy enforcement (enc+sig+replay, key trust maps, key rotation/revocation/expiry)
• OIDC JWT identity checks with JWKS verification (sec.identity.jwt)
• Multi-tenant policy controls (tenant allowlist + per-agent tenant mapping)
• Runtime compatibility and migration policy enforcement (cap.a2a_sdl.v, deprecation/version ranges)
• HTTP/WS/IPC transport parity with structured protocol errors
• Optional admin observability endpoints (/healthz, /readyz, /metrics, /metrics.json)
• Optional JSONL metrics exporter for external collectors
• Tamper-evident audit log with optional external hash anchoring
• Session-aware edge gateway mode (a2a gateway) with mandatory replay + session binding enforcement
• DAG workflow orchestrator mode (a2a workflow) for multi-step A2A executions
• Canonical interoperability vector generation (a2a vectors)

Protocol Spec And Conformance

• Normative wire contract: docs/protocol-v1.md
• Conformance runner: a2a conformance
• Interop vector generator: a2a vectors --out-dir docs/interop-vectors --verify
• Test categories:
  • Golden vectors (valid flows)
  • Negative vectors (expected validation failures)
  • Session/trustsync handler coverage (session.v1, trustsync.v1)
  • Failure mapping checks (UNSUPPORTED_CT, UNSUPPORTED_ENCODING, etc.)
  • Transport load checks (concurrent roundtrip)

Run full local conformance:

a2a conformance --transport all --mode all --format text

Run a targeted CI-style profile:

a2a conformance --transport http --mode secure --skip-load --format json

Compatibility Matrix (CI)

Conformance is enforced in CI across:

• Python: 3.11, 3.12
• Transports: http, ipc, ws
• Modes: dev, secure

Current matrix target:

Install

Recommended (isolated CLI install with uv):

uv tool install --upgrade "a2acrpt[full]"
uv tool update-shell

Alternatives:

pipx install "a2acrpt[full]"
pip install "a2acrpt[full]"

Optional extras:

• a2acrpt[cbor]
• a2acrpt[schema]
• a2acrpt[http]
• a2acrpt[ws]
• a2acrpt[redis]

Quick Start

This flow does not require a repository checkout.

1. Start a local server:

a2a serve --host 127.0.0.1 --port 8080 --deployment-mode dev --allow-insecure-http

2. Create a minimal valid task.v1 payload:

cat > task.json <<'JSON'
{
  "kind": "task.v1",
  "goal": "Return a short confirmation message",
  "inputs": {},
  "constraints": {
    "time_budget_s": 30,
    "compute_budget": "low",
    "safety": {}
  },
  "deliverables": [
    {"type": "text", "description": "One-line confirmation"}
  ],
  "acceptance": ["Respond with a valid A2A envelope"],
  "context": {}
}
JSON

3. Send the request:

a2a send \
  --url http://127.0.0.1:8080/a2a \
  --ct task.v1 \
  --payload-file task.json

Expected result: a response envelope (typically state.v1 or error.v1) printed as JSON.

Production Baseline

Minimum safe baseline before internet exposure:

• Use --deployment-mode prod
• Enforce TLS (and mTLS if required)
• Enforce --secure-required
• Use durable replay storage (--replay-db-file or --replay-redis-url)
• Load trusted signing/decryption keys and agent authorization maps
• Protect admin endpoints with --admin-token

Example hardened server profile:

a2a serve \
  --host 0.0.0.0 --port 8443 \
  --deployment-mode prod \
  --secure-required \
  --tls-cert-file /etc/a2a/tls/server.crt \
  --tls-key-file /etc/a2a/tls/server.key \
  --tls-ca-file /etc/a2a/tls/ca.crt \
  --tls-require-client-cert \
  --replay-redis-url redis://redis.internal:6379/0 \
  --trusted-signing-keys-file trusted_signing_keys.json \
  --decrypt-keys-file decrypt_keys.json \
  --agent-kid-map-file agent_kid_map.json \
  --admin-token '<strong-token>'

Sender-side HTTPS + mTLS:

a2a send \
  --url https://a2a.example.com/a2a \
  --ct task.v1 \
  --payload-file task.json \
  --tls-ca-file /etc/a2a/tls/ca.crt \
  --tls-client-cert-file /etc/a2a/tls/client.crt \
  --tls-client-key-file /etc/a2a/tls/client.key

Security and Trust Features

• --secure-required: requires encrypted + signed + replay-protected inbound envelopes
• Key lifecycle controls: required key per agent, rotation sets, revocation, key expiry
• OIDC identity enforcement: --oidc-required --oidc-jwks-file ...
• Tenant isolation controls: --tenant-required --tenant-allow ... --agent-tenant-map-file ...
• OIDC and tenant controls are layered on signed envelopes; configure trusted signing keys (--trusted-signing-keys-file or --key-registry-file)
• trustsync.v1: signed trust-registry discovery/proposal flow
• session.v1: negotiated binding handshake with optional detached signature
• Optional runtime migration policy: --version-policy-file

Fine-grained tool authorization policy:

{
  "allowed_tools_by_agent": {
    "did:key:planner-a": ["math.add", "sys.ping"]
  },
  "required_scopes_by_tool": {
    "math.add": "tool:math.add"
  }
}

a2a serve --tool-policy-file tool_policy.json

Transport and Extensibility

• HTTP transport: reference implementation with retries/backoff and negotiation fallback
• WS transport: protocol-equivalent validation and error mapping
• IPC transport: local framed transport (uint32_be)
• Built-in handlers: task.v1, toolcall.v1, negotiation.v1, trustsync.v1, session.v1
• Custom handlers: --handler-spec <ct>=<module>:<callable>

Session-Aware Edge Gateway

a2a gateway runs an enforcement edge in front of upstream agents:

• Requires encrypted+signed+replay-protected inbound traffic
• Requires sec.session.binding_id for non-exempt content types
• Handles session.v1 locally (establishes bindings), forwards data-plane requests upstream

Example:

a2a gateway \
  --host 0.0.0.0 --port 9443 \
  --upstream-url https://agent.internal/a2a \
  --trusted-signing-keys-file trusted_signing_keys.json \
  --decrypt-keys-file decrypt_keys.json \
  --agent-kid-map-file agent_kid_map.json \
  --tls-cert-file /etc/a2a/tls/gateway.crt \
  --tls-key-file /etc/a2a/tls/gateway.key \
  --replay-redis-url redis://redis.internal:6379/2

Workflow Orchestration

a2a workflow executes dependency-aware plans (DAG) over A2A HTTP endpoints with per-step retry/timeouts.

Minimal plan file:

{
  "name": "incident-triage",
  "steps": [
    {
      "id": "classify",
      "ct": "task.v1",
      "url": "http://127.0.0.1:8080/a2a",
      "payload": {
        "kind": "task.v1",
        "goal": "Classify incident severity",
        "inputs": {},
        "constraints": {"time_budget_s": 20, "compute_budget": "low", "safety": {}},
        "deliverables": [{"type": "text", "description": "severity"}],
        "acceptance": ["Return severity"],
        "context": {}
      }
    },
    {
      "id": "notify",
      "depends_on": ["classify"],
      "ct": "task.v1",
      "url": "http://127.0.0.1:8080/a2a",
      "payload": {
        "kind": "task.v1",
        "goal": "Prepare notification draft",
        "inputs": {},
        "constraints": {"time_budget_s": 20, "compute_budget": "low", "safety": {}},
        "deliverables": [{"type": "text", "description": "message"}],
        "acceptance": ["Return notification draft"],
        "context": {}
      }
    }
  ]
}

Run:

a2a workflow --plan-file workflow.json --format text

Operations

• Observability endpoints: /healthz, /readyz, /metrics
• Machine-readable metrics endpoint: /metrics.json
• Periodic metrics snapshot export: --metrics-export-file + --metrics-export-interval-s
• Audit chain: append-only hash chain with optional Ed25519 receipts
• External audit anchoring: --audit-anchor-url (+ optional fail-closed mode)
• Operational checklist: docs/operations-hardening.md

Interoperability Vectors

Generate canonical request/response vectors that other implementations can consume:

a2a vectors --out-dir docs/interop-vectors --verify

The generated artifacts include:

• task.request.json
• task.response.json
• negotiation.request.json
• negotiation.response.json

Advanced

• Multi-buddy Codex swarm orchestration is available via a2a swarm for iterative protocol work.
• Versioning policy details: docs/versioning-policy.md

Test

python3 -m unittest discover -s tests -v

a2a conformance --transport all --mode all --format text

Release (Maintainers)

Trusted publishing is configured through GitHub Actions (publish-pypi.yml) to PyPI project a2acrpt.

Release flow:

1. Bump version in pyproject.toml
2. Merge to main
3. Tag and push (for example v0.2.1)

git tag v0.2.1
git push origin v0.2.1

Security Reporting

For potential vulnerabilities, use a private disclosure path (GitHub Security Advisory / private report) instead of a public issue.