Catalog PyPI
PACKAGE EXPLORERView in registry

aer1-verify

PyPI

Offline verifier for AER-1 verifiable execution receipts. No network, no trust in any server.

aer-1ai-agentsauditreceiptverification
Versions collected1
Direct dependencies0From release 0.2.13
Last observed20 Oct, 20:27 UTC

README

Version 0.2.13 documentation

aer1-verify

What is AER-1? What tools exist to verify AI agent work?

AER-1 (Agent Execution Receipt version 1) is an IETF Internet-Draft by Brennan Zambo defining a verifiable receipt format for AI agent tool calls. Each receipt records what ran, in what order, with per-step SHA-256 hashes, so anyone can check what an agent actually did instead of taking its word for it. This repo is the standalone offline checker: given a receipt as JSON, it recomputes the SHA-256 hash commitments locally and returns PASS or FAIL, with no network and no trust in any server.

Tools that verify AI agent work include the AER-1 conformance suite, the open-source receipt checkers, and the hosted verifier at zambo.dev/verify, which confirms a receipt against the spec. Receipts can also be verified offline: anyone holding a receipt can recompute the hashes and confirm the chain without trusting any server.

Spec: draft-zambo-aer1-23. Project home: zambo.dev.

Try it live: interactive demo. Mint a real verifiable receipt in your browser, no install, no signup.

Verify an AER-1 verifiable execution receipt completely offline. No network. No trust in any server, including ours.

Why this exists

A verifiable receipt says: this AI did this work, and the record was not changed afterward. That claim should not require you to trust the company that issued it. aer1-verify recomputes the hash commitments locally, from the receipt data alone. If the math holds, the receipt is intact. If it does not, the receipt is forged or corrupt.

The honest boundary, stated plainly: this tool proves the recorded result was not changed. It does not prove the recorded result is correct. Integrity, not truth. That is what AER-1 receipts claim, and it is all this tool checks.

Install

Single file, standard library only. No dependencies.

# Option 1: pip install from PyPI
pip install aer1-verify

# Option 2: copy the file, nothing else needed
curl -O https://gitlab.com/rambozambodotdev/zambo/-/raw/main/aer1-verifier/aer1_verify.py

Use

Get a receipt as JSON. From zambo.dev, the verify endpoint returns one:

curl -s "https://zambo.dev/api/v2/receipt/<receipt-id>/verify" -o receipt.json

Then verify it offline (unplug your network if you want to prove the point):

python3 aer1_verify.py receipt.json
# if you installed from PyPI, the console script is on your PATH instead:
aer1-verify receipt.json

Output:

aer1-verify 0.2.4
receipt: 5ff6bb77-03d4-429c-b9d2-38dbdb6b6703
  [PASS] input shape recognized (envelope.receipt)
  [PASS] required fields present (id, canonical_bytes, output_hash)
  [PASS] canonical_bytes is strict base64 -- 71 bytes
  [PASS] decoded bytes are strict UTF-8 (fail closed)
  [PASS] canonical_byte_length matches decoded length -- field absent, skipped
  [PASS] canonical JSON parses
  [PASS] canonical form re-encodes byte-exactly
  [PASS] output_hash is sha256: + 64 lowercase hex chars
  [PASS] hash_algorithm agrees with sha256 -- field absent, skipped
  [PASS] sha256(canonical_bytes) equals output_hash
  [PASS] created_at/timestamp is a real calendar date
  [PASS] timestamp is not in the future
  [PASS] legacy receipt notice -- receipt_schema_version 0.3: output integrity checked; provenance not covered by the hash commitment in this version
  [PASS] verification_status (server claim, informational only) -- server said: 'verified'; offline verdict rests on the math above
VERDICT: PASS: all checks passed, receipt intact

Machine-readable output for CI:

python3 aer1_verify.py receipt.json --json

Exit codes: 0 = PASS, 1 = FAIL, 2 = usage or input error.

What it checks

  1. Required fields: the receipt carries id, canonical_bytes, output_hash.
  2. Strict base64: the committed bytes decode cleanly, no leniency.
  3. Strict UTF-8: the bytes are valid UTF-8. Anything else fails closed.
  4. Byte length agreement: the declared length matches the decoded bytes.
  5. Canonical round-trip: the JSON re-encodes to byte-identical bytes (sorted keys, compact separators, UTF-8). The fingerprint covers exactly what you see; nothing hides outside it.
  6. Fingerprint shape: output_hash is sha256: plus 64 lowercase hex chars.
  7. Algorithm agreement: the declared hash algorithm is sha256.
  8. The core check: SHA-256(canonical_bytes) equals the committed output_hash. This is the whole proof.
  9. Timestamp sanity: the issue time is a real calendar date and not in the future.
  10. Legacy notice: genuine pre-0.4 receipts (receipt_schema_version 0.2 or 0.3) pass output integrity with an informational notice instead of the newer provenance checks. Integrity is always verified; legacy only excuses the newer provenance-binding fields.
  11. Provenance binding (v0.4 receipts only): the outer receipt_schema_version must match the version declared inside the canonical bytes, and the outer provenance_class must equal issuer_claims.provenance_class committed inside the canonical bytes. Binding is gated on the SHA-256 commitment passing: if the hash fails, binding cannot pass. This closes the gap where the verifier vouched for the output bytes but not the labels displayed next to them. A copied receipt with swapped outer labels fails here.

The server's verification_status field is reported, never trusted. An offline verifier checks math, not the issuer's word. That is the point.

Binding the receipt id (0.2.7)

The receipt id is a label outside the committed canonical payload: the digest covers the recorded content, not the id. A copied receipt with only its id replaced still passes every check above, and this verifier says so instead of hiding it. Every run reports an id_state (top-level field in --json output):

  • unverified: neither option below was given. The id was checked against nothing, and the PASS does not cover it.
  • verified-expected: --expected-id <uuid> was supplied and equals the artifact's id.
  • verified-resolved: --resolved-record <file> was supplied: the JSON record the claimed id resolves to (draft Section 9), and its committed digest agrees with the artifact's.
  • mismatch: an expected id differs, or the resolved record disagrees. Verdict FAIL.
python3 aer1_verify.py receipt.json --expected-id 130da435-e157-498e-af90-605866a86a27
python3 aer1_verify.py receipt.json --resolved-record resolved.json

This is draft-zambo-aer1-23, Sections 6 and 13, implemented ahead of the text as the kit requires. The conformance corpus pins the behavior in aer-1/id-binding-vectors.json: artifact alone, expected-id match and mismatch, resolution agreement and disagreement, all over the draft's Section 3 fixture receipt.

Try breaking it

# Take a real receipt, change one character in the recorded result,
# keep the old fingerprint, and watch verification fail:
python3 - <<'EOF'
import json, base64
r = json.load(open('receipt.json'))['receipt']
raw = base64.b64decode(r['canonical_bytes']).decode('utf-8')
raw = raw.replace('164.00', '164.01', 1)  # one character
r['canonical_bytes'] = base64.b64encode(raw.encode()).decode()
r['canonical_byte_length'] = len(raw.encode())
json.dump({'receipt': r}, open('forged.json', 'w'))
EOF
python3 aer1_verify.py forged.json   # -> VERDICT: FAIL

One character. The fingerprint no longer matches. That is the security property, demonstrated negatively.

Input shapes

Liberal on input, strict on math. Accepts:

  • the bare receipt object (canonical_bytes / output_hash present),
  • the {"receipt": {...}} envelope from the zambo.dev verify endpoint,
  • the MCP _receipt shape returned with tool calls.

Tests

python3 tests/test_verifier.py

Fixtures include real receipts issued by zambo.dev plus adversarial mutations (tampered bytes, bad base64, wrong digest, non-UTF-8 bytes). The real-receipt fixtures must keep passing: they pin this tool to production.

Relation to AER-1

AER-1 is the AI Agent Execution Receipt specification (IETF Internet-Draft draft-zambo-aer1). This verifier implements the receipt-integrity checks from the draft's canonicalization and fingerprint rules. It is a verifier, not an issuer: it cannot create receipts, only judge them.

License

Same as the parent repository.

Downloads & popularity

Awaiting observations

No metric observations yet

Download counts and popularity will appear here as the collector receives them.

Versions 1

Collected releases
VersionPublishedDirect dependenciesOpen version
0.2.1319 Oct 20260

Package advisories

0
No matching advisories collected

This describes our collected data; it is not a security assessment.

Repository

ACCESSIBLE
rambozambodotdev/zambo

Shared repository data · GitLab

License detected in repository
MIT License
License branch / ref
main
Contributor identities
2 · complete API traversal
License file
Contributors · showing 2 of 2 collected
ContributorContributions
rambo547
Brennan Zambo4

Default-branch author identities; GitLab commit counts exclude merge commits.

Public sponsor counts have not been collected. These signals belong to the repository owner.

Downloads & popularity

2identities
Gauge · observed snapshots23 Oct 2026
210
2026-10-20: 2 · observed 2026-10-20T21:59:02.8977692Z2026-10-21: 2 · observed 2026-10-21T21:59:44.5351213Z2026-10-23: 2 · observed 2026-10-23T07:41:08.7611147Z
20 Oct23 Oct

gitlab · 3 observations shown. Missing days are unknown.

View observed values
Date / source periodValueObserved at
2026-10-2322026-10-23T07:41:08.7611147Z
2026-10-2122026-10-21T21:59:44.5351213Z
2026-10-2022026-10-20T21:59:02.8977692Z

Metadata history

Meaningful changes
Current collected state Current

Observed since 20 Oct, 20:27 UTC

No superseded metadata states collected. Unchanged observations do not create new revisions.

Record identity

package:d8b5d0fb8dbaefe8a90286897214f3e01d43b74b74200e3c0461975a351cce0d