agent-firewall1

Agent Firewall

A runtime security and governance layer that evaluates AI-agent tool requests before they execute and returns one of three decisions: allow, ask (require human approval), or block.

The engine is vendor-neutral and dependency-light (just pydantic + PyYAML) so it can run inside a Claude Code PreToolUse hook with no network and no database. The same engine can back an MCP gateway or an HTTP service.

It is a policy gate, not a sandbox. It never executes the tool it is judging, and it only reasons about what the integration hands it. Read docs/limitations.md for the honest threat model before you rely on it.

How it works

Every request flows through a fixed, security-critical pipeline (src/agent_firewall/engine.py):

1. Authorization (fail-closed). Unknown tools and unauthorized agents are rejected before anything else. (authorization.py)
2. Detection. Deterministic detectors appropriate to the action type run: shell-command shapes, filesystem path analysis, secret/DLP scanning, and prompt-injection indicators. (detection/)
3. Risk scoring. Findings are turned into an additive, fully attributed 0–100 score with per-factor explanations — no learned component. (risk/)
4. Policy evaluation. Declarative YAML policies decide allow / approval / deny, with the risk score available as a threshold. (policies/)
5. Combine. Precedence is deny > approval > allow. A high score can only raise scrutiny; it can never rescue a denied request, and a low score can never override a deny.

Each decision is explainable (explanation, matched_policies, matched_rules, risk_factors) and recorded to a tamper-evident audit log.

Install

Requires Python ≥ 3.11.

pip install -e .          # core engine + CLI
pip install -e ".[dev]"   # + pytest, ruff, mypy, hypothesis
pip install -e ".[api]"   # + optional FastAPI/SQLAlchemy service deps
pip install -e ".[mcp]"   # + optional MCP gateway deps

The repo also works without installing: hooks/pre_tool_use.py inserts src/ onto sys.path itself.

Use it as a Claude Code hook

.claude/settings.json already wires the firewall as a PreToolUse hook over the file, shell, and network tools:

{
  "hooks": {
    "PreToolUse": [{
      "matcher": "Bash|Read|Write|Edit|MultiEdit|NotebookEdit|WebFetch|Glob|Grep",
      "hooks": [{
        "type": "command",
        "command": "python",
        "args": ["${CLAUDE_PROJECT_DIR}/hooks/pre_tool_use.py"],
        "timeout": 10
      }]
    }]
  }
}

Decision mapping to the hook protocol:

Deferring on allow means the firewall never disables native permission controls — it only ever tightens them. Remove the hooks block (or the file) to disable it entirely.

CLI

# Evaluate a synthetic request and print the full decision as JSON
agent-firewall evaluate --tool Bash --input '{"command": "rm -rf /"}'

# Validate a policy file against the schema
agent-firewall policy validate policies/default.yaml

# Inspect / verify the audit log
agent-firewall audit show --limit 20
agent-firewall audit verify

(agent-firewall hook runs the same stdin-driven hook adapter directly.)

Use it as an MCP gateway

The same engine can be exposed as a Model Context Protocol server so any MCP client can consult the firewall before running a tool:

pip install -e ".[mcp]"
agent-firewall mcp        # serve over stdio

It registers one tool, evaluate_tool_request, that returns an allow / ask / block decision for a described request. It is a consultative gate — the calling agent must honor the decision. See docs/mcp-gateway.md.

Policies

Policies are declarative YAML (policies/default.yaml). Selectors within a policy are ANDed; lists within a selector are ORed. Effects are allow, approval, or deny, with deny winning. The bundled set:

• block-protected-credentials — never read/write .env, keys, .ssh, .aws, …
• block-critical-risk — deny anything scoring ≥ 85 (how rm -rf /, mkfs, fork bombs, secret egress get hard-blocked — the score can't be argued away)
• require-approval-elevated-risk — score ≥ 50 (< 85) needs human approval
• require-approval-network-egress — outbound tools (WebFetch) need approval
• allow-project-reads — reading non-sensitive files is allowed

Configuration

Read from the environment (src/agent_firewall/config.py):

Audit log

Append-only JSONL with a SHA-256 hash chain; audit verify detects truncation or edits, and concurrent processes serialize appends via a lock file. Request summaries are secret-scrubbed and raw tool input is never written verbatim. It is tamper-evident, not tamper-proof — see docs/limitations.md.

Development

python -m pytest        # test suite (unit tests in tests/)
python scripts/smoke_test.py   # end-to-end sanity check on synthetic inputs
ruff check .            # lint
mypy                    # strict type-check

All test fixtures and smoke-test inputs use synthetic credentials and safe, non-executed command strings.

Project layout

src/agent_firewall/
  engine.py           core evaluation pipeline
  authorization.py    fail-closed identity/tool gate
  normalize.py        vendor payload -> NormalizedRequest
  models.py           typed domain models (pydantic)
  config.py           env-driven CoreConfig
  detection/          command / filesystem / secrets / dlp / prompt-injection
  risk/               deterministic additive scorer + weights
  policies/           YAML schema, loader, evaluator
  audit/              hash-chained JSONL writer + verifier
  integrations/claude_code/   PreToolUse hook adapter
  integrations/mcp/           MCP gateway server (optional [mcp] extra)
hooks/pre_tool_use.py thin stdin entry point for Claude Code
policies/default.yaml bundled policy set
docs/limitations.md   threat model & known gaps

Contributing & security

Contributions are welcome — see CONTRIBUTING.md for the dev setup and the quality gate to run before a PR. To report a vulnerability, use GitHub private vulnerability reporting as described in SECURITY.md (please don't file public issues for security bugs).

License

MIT.