agent-kit-ai

agent-kit

Production AI agents you can govern, afford, and prove. Policy, cost control, security, and tamper-evident audit that hold across every tool, MCP server, and sub-agent — with a self-hostable ops backend and compliance-grade evidence.

pip install agent-kit-ai

First-party SDKs and agent frameworks give you a capable loop. agent-kit is for what comes after the demo:

from agent_kit import SUSPEND, Agent, AgentConfig
from agent_kit.cloud import CloudReporter
from agent_kit.durable import SQLiteRunStore
from agent_kit.hooks import Hooks, require_approval
from agent_kit.providers import AnthropicProvider
from agent_kit.scanning import PatternScanner, scan_tool_output

agent = Agent(AnthropicProvider(), tools=[lookup_order, issue_refund, research_agent.as_tool("research", "...")],
    config=AgentConfig(
        hooks=Hooks(
            before_tool=[require_approval("issue_refund")],    # a human signs off on every refund
            after_tool=[scan_tool_output(PatternScanner())],   # poisoned tool output never reaches the model
        ),
        approver=SUSPEND,                                      # approvals can wait for days...
        run_store=SQLiteRunStore("runs.db"),                   # ...and runs survive crashes and deploys
        max_run_cost_usd=0.50,                                 # hard cap, sub-agents included
        cloud=CloudReporter(project="support", agent_name="refunds"),  # fleet metrics, alerts, audit trail (AGENTKIT_BASE_URL)
    ),
)

Retry, per-provider circuit breaking, cost tracking, and a tamper-evident audit chain are on by default. Every policy above also applies inside the research sub-agent.

What you get

Govern what agents do

• Hooks and approval gates — block tools, require human approval, redact tool output, or stop runs. Fail-closed; every decision is audited.
• Tool allowlists — enforced at call time, not just hidden from the prompt.
• Tool output scanning — hidden instructions, chat-template tokens, data-exfiltration links, and known-malicious URLs, domains, and hashes (Nullcone threat intel) are blocked or marked untrusted before the model reads them.
• Agents as tools — delegate to sub-agents that inherit the caller's policy, budget, and approvals; they can't be used to route around a rule.

Prove what happened

• Tamper-evident audit chain — a hash-linked record of every model call, tool call, and policy decision; verified locally and re-verified server-side. A parent run's chain commits to each sub-agent's chain.
• Signed evidence bundles — Ed25519-signed exports anyone can verify offline with agent-kit verify, no trust in the vendor required.
• Retention, legal holds, and deletion receipts — tier-based retention, holds that block purges, and a signed receipt for every purged run.

Control cost and failure

• Cost circuit breaker — per-run caps and daily / weekly / monthly fleet budgets stop agents before the next model call, and alert when tripped.
• Cost per turn — token- and cache-aware USD for current Claude and OpenAI models; unpriced models are logged, never silently $0.
• Circuit breakers and retry — stop hammering a failing provider; every state change lands in the audit chain.
• Durable runs — checkpoints at every turn; resume after a crash, suspend for approval, never run a side effect twice.

Operate the fleet

• Self-hostable agent-kit Cloud — fleet metrics, alerting (Slack, PagerDuty, webhook, SMTP), budgets, SLA context, and the hosted audit trail on your own Postgres.
• Bring your existing agents — Claude Agent SDK and OpenAI Agents SDK adapters, plus OTLP ingest for any OpenTelemetry-instrumented agent in any language.
• Built for real workloads — MCP tools, typed results, prompt caching and context management, parallel tool calls, streaming, and Anthropic / OpenAI / Ollama / any OpenAI-compatible endpoint behind one interface.

Compliance evidence: SOC 2 and the EU AI Act

Auditors increasingly ask what your AI agents were allowed to do, what they did, and whether the record can be trusted. agent-kit produces that evidence as a by-product of running the agent:

agent-kit doesn't make an organization SOC 2 or EU AI Act compliant, and agent-kit Cloud has no SOC 2 report of its own — it gives your compliance program trustworthy records about your AI agents. Confirm the mapping with your auditor.

Not yet: handoffs — tracked in specs/06-harness-roadmap.md.

---

Quick start

8-line minimal agent

import asyncio
from agent_kit import Agent
from agent_kit.providers import AnthropicProvider

async def main():
    agent = Agent(AnthropicProvider())
    result = await agent.run("Explain the Monty Hall problem in two sentences.")
    print(result.output)
    print(f"Cost: ${result.total_cost_usd:.4f}")

asyncio.run(main())

Add a tool (6 more lines)

import httpx
from agent_kit import tool

@tool(description="Fetch the current price of a crypto asset", idempotent=True)
async def get_price(symbol: str) -> dict:
    async with httpx.AsyncClient() as c:
        return (await c.get(f"https://api.coingecko.com/api/v3/simple/price?ids={symbol}&vs_currencies=usd")).json()

agent = Agent(AnthropicProvider(), tools=[get_price])
result = await agent.run("What is the current Bitcoin price?")

Production hardening in config

from agent_kit import Agent, AgentConfig
from agent_kit.types import RetryPolicyConfig, CircuitBreakerConfig

agent = Agent(
    provider=AnthropicProvider(),
    config=AgentConfig(
        system_prompt="You are a helpful assistant.",
        retry_policy=RetryPolicyConfig(max_attempts=3),
        circuit_breaker=CircuitBreakerConfig(failure_threshold=5),
        audit_enabled=True,    # tamper-evident Merkle audit chain
    ),
)
result = await agent.run("Summarize the latest AI research.")
print(f"Audit root hash: {result.audit_root_hash}")  # verify integrity later

Multi-stage pipeline

from agent_kit.orchestrator import LinearPipeline

pipeline = LinearPipeline([
    (researcher, "Research this topic: {input}"),
    (writer,     "Write a blog post from these facts: {input}"),
    (editor,     "Polish and tighten this draft: {input}"),
])
result = await pipeline.run("The future of AI agent frameworks")
print(result.final_output)
print(f"Total cost: ${result.total_cost_usd:.4f} across {len(result.stage_results)} stages")

---

Demos

Parallel research DAG

Three specialist agents research concurrently, then a fourth synthesizes. The DAG handles dependency resolution and runs independent nodes in parallel.

# examples/research_dag.py
dag = DAGOrchestrator([
    TaskNode("market", market_agent, "Market analysis of: {input}"),
    TaskNode("tech",   tech_agent,   "Technical landscape for: {input}"),
    TaskNode("risk",   risk_agent,   "Risk assessment for: {input}"),
    TaskNode("synthesis", synthesizer,
             "Synthesize:\n{upstream:market}\n{upstream:tech}\n{upstream:risk}",
             depends_on=["market", "tech", "risk"]),
])
result = await dag.execute("autonomous AI agents in enterprise production")

$ python examples/research_dag.py
Researching: autonomous AI agents in enterprise production systems
DAG: market + tech + risk (parallel) → synthesis

============================================================
EXECUTIVE BRIEFING
============================================================
Verdict: Enterprise AI agent adoption is accelerating but premature
for mission-critical workflows without proper guardrails.

The market is projected to reach $47B by 2028 (34% CAGR), with
75% of Fortune 500 companies running pilot programs. Technically,
the shift from chain-of-thought to tool-using agents with circuit
breakers and audit trails has made production deployment viable.
However, three risks dominate: regulatory uncertainty around
autonomous decision-making, cost blowouts from retry cascades,
and the "ghost agent" problem — orphaned processes consuming
resources with no human oversight.

Recommendation: Deploy with hard cost ceilings, tamper-evident
audit logging, and circuit breakers on all provider calls.
============================================================

Execution order: market → tech → risk → synthesis
Wall time: 4.2s
Total cost: $0.0183
Total tokens: 4,271

Per-node breakdown:
  market        $0.0041    982 tokens
  tech          $0.0044  1,053 tokens
  risk          $0.0038    891 tokens
  synthesis     $0.0060  1,345 tokens

Production-safe agent with audit trail

Tool allowlisting, Merkle audit chain, and compliance export. The agent has delete_employee registered but it's blocked — only check_pto and submit_pto are allowed.

# examples/safe_agent.py
agent = Agent(
    provider=AnthropicProvider(),
    tools=[check_pto, submit_pto, delete_employee],
    config=AgentConfig(
        system_prompt="You are an HR assistant.",
        allowed_tools=["check_pto", "submit_pto"],  # delete_employee → blocked
    ),
)
result = await agent.run("I'm employee E003. Can I take 5 days off for vacation?")

$ python examples/safe_agent.py
Running agent with tool allowlist: [check_pto, submit_pto]
(delete_employee is registered but BLOCKED)

============================================================
RESPONSE
============================================================
I checked your PTO balance, Carol. You have 17 days remaining
(20 allocated, 3 used). I've submitted your request for 5 days
for your family vacation.

Your confirmation number is PTO-2026-0042.

============================================================
AUDIT TRAIL
============================================================
Events recorded: 6
Root hash: a1c9f3e7d204b85610ef38c7...
Chain integrity: VERIFIED

Cost: $0.0052 | Tokens: 1,203

Event log:
  [0] agent_start                     actor=run-8f3a2c...
  [1] llm_complete                    actor=anthropic
  [2] tool_call                       actor=check_pto
  [3] llm_complete                    actor=anthropic
  [4] tool_call                       actor=submit_pto
  [5] agent_complete                  actor=run-8f3a2c...

JSONL export: 6 records, 1,847 bytes
First record: agent_start
Last record:  agent_complete

Cloud-monitored agent with live tools

Real HTTP tools (no API keys needed), circuit breaker config, console tracing, and optional cloud reporting for fleet-wide visibility.

# examples/cloud_monitored.py
agent = Agent(
    provider=AnthropicProvider(),
    tools=[get_weather, top_hn_story, country_facts],
    config=AgentConfig(
        retry_policy=RetryPolicyConfig(max_attempts=3),
        circuit_breaker=CircuitBreakerConfig(failure_threshold=5, recovery_timeout_s=30),
        tracer=AgentTracer(backend="console"),
        cloud=reporter,  # optional — ships events to fleet dashboard
    ),
)

$ python examples/cloud_monitored.py
Cloud reporting: ENABLED (events → fleet dashboard)

Agent: Agent(provider='anthropic', tools=['get_weather', 'top_hn_story', 'country_facts'], model='claude-sonnet-4-20250514')
============================================================
{"span":"agent.run","kind":"agent","duration_ms":3841,"attributes":{"run_id":"e9f1..."}}
{"span":"llm.complete","kind":"llm","duration_ms":1203,"attributes":{"input_tokens":847,"output_tokens":52,"cost_usd":0.0031}}
{"tool_call":"get_weather","duration_ms":340,"success":true}
{"tool_call":"top_hn_story","duration_ms":289,"success":true}
{"tool_call":"country_facts","duration_ms":195,"success":true}
{"cost_event":true,"tokens":1847,"model":"claude-sonnet-4-20250514","usd":0.0058,"cumulative_usd":0.0089}
{"span":"llm.complete","kind":"llm","duration_ms":1814,"attributes":{"input_tokens":1203,"output_tokens":644,"cost_usd":0.0058}}

============================================================
RESPONSE
============================================================
Here's what I found:

🌤 Tokyo: 18°C (64°F), partly cloudy, 62% humidity, wind 8 mph

📰 Top HN story: "Show HN: I built a self-healing Kubernetes operator"
   by tobiaswright — 847 points

🇯🇵 Japan: Capital Tokyo, population 125,681,593, East Asia
   Languages: Japanese

============================================================
TELEMETRY
============================================================
Turns: 2
Cost:  $0.0089
Tokens: 1,847
Audit hash: f7a2e19c830d...
Trace ID: 4c91b7a3-8e2f-4d1a-b3c9-7f2e1a3d5b8c

Events shipped to agent-kit Cloud. View at your fleet dashboard.

---

Providers

from agent_kit.providers import AnthropicProvider

# Anthropic (default — uses ANTHROPIC_API_KEY env var)
provider = AnthropicProvider()
provider = AnthropicProvider(api_key="sk-ant-...", default_model="claude-sonnet-5")

# OpenAI (requires pip install agent-kit-ai[openai])
from agent_kit.providers.openai import OpenAIProvider
provider = OpenAIProvider()

# Ollama (local models)
from agent_kit.providers.ollama import OllamaProvider
provider = OllamaProvider(default_model="llama3.2")

# Any OpenAI-compatible endpoint
from agent_kit.providers.openai import OpenAIProvider
provider = OpenAIProvider(base_url="http://localhost:11434/v1", api_key="none", default_model="mistral")

---

Observability

from agent_kit.observability import AgentTracer

# Zero dependencies — no-op (default)
tracer = AgentTracer()

# Structured JSON to stderr — no extra deps
tracer = AgentTracer(backend="console")

# Full OpenTelemetry (requires pip install agent-kit-ai[otel])
tracer = AgentTracer(backend="otlp", service_name="my-agent", endpoint="http://localhost:4317")

agent = Agent(provider, config=AgentConfig(tracer=tracer))

---

Audit chain

Every agent run produces a tamper-evident Merkle audit chain:

agent = Agent(provider, config=AgentConfig(audit_enabled=True))
result = await agent.run("Do something important.")

# Verify chain integrity
assert agent.audit.verify()
print(f"Root hash: {result.audit_root_hash}")

# Export to JSONL for compliance storage
with open("audit.jsonl", "w") as f:
    f.write(agent.audit.export_jsonl())

---

Circuit breaker

The circuit breaker wraps every LLM provider call. It transitions:

• CLOSED → normal operation
• OPEN → failing fast (no LLM calls; raises CircuitOpenError)
• HALF_OPEN → probing recovery after recovery_timeout_s

from agent_kit.types import CircuitBreakerConfig

config = AgentConfig(
    circuit_breaker=CircuitBreakerConfig(
        failure_threshold=5,      # open after 5 consecutive failures
        recovery_timeout_s=60.0,  # attempt recovery after 60s
        success_threshold=2,      # 2 successes in half-open → closed
    )
)

---

Reliability

from agent_kit.types import RetryPolicyConfig, BackoffConfig

policy = RetryPolicyConfig(
    max_attempts=3,
    backoff=BackoffConfig(
        initial_delay_s=1.0,
        multiplier=2.0,
        max_delay_s=30.0,
        jitter=True,
    ),
    retryable_on=["ProviderError", "httpx.TimeoutException"],
)

---

Tool allowlist

Lock down which tools an agent can call — enforced at the registry level, not just advisory:

agent = Agent(
    provider,
    tools=[web_search, read_file, delete_file, send_email],
    config=AgentConfig(allowed_tools=["web_search", "read_file"]),
    # delete_file and send_email raise ToolNotAllowedError if the LLM tries to call them
)

---

Typed results

Pass any type Pydantic can validate — a model, dataclass, TypedDict, list[...], enum — and get a validated value back. Tools, hooks, budgets, and audit still apply on the way there.

class Quote(BaseModel):
    customer: str
    total_usd: float

result = await agent.run("Quote Acme for 10 widgets", output_type=Quote)
result.parsed.total_usd      # validated Quote; result.output is the raw JSON

• Anthropic and OpenAI constrain the answer with native structured outputs. Ollama does too, except in runs with tools, where its grammar would block tool calls — there the schema goes in the system prompt and repairs are constrained natively. Other providers get the schema in the system prompt.
• An answer that fails validation goes back to the model with the errors (AgentConfig(output_retries=2)), then OutputValidationError is raised. Each failure is audited as output_validation_failed.
• agent.stream(prompt, output_type=Quote) streams the raw JSON; agent.last_result.parsed holds the value.

Full example: examples/typed_output.py.

---

Context management

Long tool-heavy runs stay correct, cached, and inside the context window with no configuration:

• Prompt caching is on. Anthropic requests carry a breakpoint on the system prompt plus automatic caching of the growing conversation; cached input shows up in turn.cost.cache_read_tokens. AgentConfig(prompt_caching=False) turns it off.
• Thinking and compaction blocks round-trip verbatim. Claude models that think (Claude Opus 5 and Sonnet 5 do by default) get every thinking block back unchanged, including through SQLiteMemory.
• History is trimmed by tokens, not message count. When the next request would exceed context_budget_tokens (default 150K), the oldest turns are cut once down to half the budget, never separating a tool call from its result. Between cuts the history only grows at the end, so the prompt prefix — and the cache — stays valid. Each cut is audited as context_trimmed.

config = AgentConfig(
    effort="high",                    # Anthropic output_config.effort / OpenAI reasoning_effort
    thinking="adaptive",              # Anthropic thinking
    provider_options={"thinking": {"display": "summarized"}},   # merged into every request
    compaction=Compaction(trigger_tokens=100_000),              # Anthropic server-side summarisation
    clear_tool_results=ClearToolResults(trigger_tokens=60_000, keep=4),
)

With compaction, the API summarises earlier context itself: client trimming stops, compaction cost is included in total_cost_usd, and each summarisation is audited as context_compacted (tool-result clearing as context_edited). memory_window=N still caps history by message count if you want it. Full example: examples/long_running_agent.py.

---

Hooks and approval gates

Put policy around what an agent does — deny tools, require a human, redact what tools return, or stop the run:

from agent_kit.hooks import Decision, Hooks, deny_tools, require_approval

async def approve(req):                      # Slack button, approvals API, terminal prompt…
    return await slack.ask(f"Run {req.tool_name}({req.arguments})?")

agent = Agent(
    provider,
    tools=[lookup_order, refund_order, close_account],
    config=AgentConfig(
        hooks=Hooks(
            before_tool=[
                deny_tools("close_account", reason="needs a human", stop_run=True),
                require_approval("refund_order", reason="refunds move money"),
            ],
            after_tool=[redact_cards],        # return Decision.replace(masked_output)
            before_llm=[stop_after_hours],    # return Decision.deny("outside business hours")
        ),
        approver=approve,
        approval_timeout_s=300,              # no answer → deny
    ),
)

Hooks can be sync or async; returning None allows. Everything else fails closed: a hook that raises, an ask with no approver, a denied or timed-out approval — all deny. A denied tool call reaches the model as a tool error it can work around; stop_run=True raises RunStoppedByHookError. Every decision is an audit event (tool_denied, approval_requested, approval_granted, approval_denied, tool_output_replaced, llm_call_denied). Full example: examples/approval_gate.py.

---

Durable runs

Give an agent a run store and every run checkpoints at each turn boundary. Runs survive crashes and deploys, and approvals can wait for a human for as long as it takes:

from agent_kit import SUSPEND
from agent_kit.durable import SQLiteRunStore

agent = Agent(provider, tools=[refund], config=AgentConfig(
    run_store=SQLiteRunStore("runs.db"),
    hooks=Hooks(before_tool=[require_approval("refund")]),
    approver=SUSPEND,                                  # park the run instead of waiting inline
))
result = await agent.run("Refund order A-1001", run_id="ticket-9913")
result.status               # "suspended"
result.pending_approvals    # [PendingApproval(call_id=..., tool_name="refund", arguments={...})]

# hours later, in any process that builds the same Agent:
result = await agent.resume("ticket-9913", approvals={call_id: True})

• Crash recovery. agent.resume(run_id) continues a run that crashed, failed, or was killed, from its last checkpoint. A tool that was running when the process died is re-run only if it is marked idempotent=True; otherwise the model is told the call was interrupted, so a refund never runs twice.
• One owner at a time. Checkpoint writes are compare-and-swap: if two workers resume the same run, one gets RunConflictError before it can execute anything.
• Continuity. Memory, turns, run cost, typed-output state, and the audit chain are restored — the chain verifies across the suspension (run_suspended, run_resumed, tool_interrupted events).
• resume_stream() streams a resumed run; resuming a completed run returns its stored result.

RunStore is a small async protocol (save / load / mark_tool_started / list / delete), so Postgres or Redis stores drop in. Full example: examples/durable_approval.py.

---

Agents as tools

Turn any agent into a tool another agent can delegate to:

research = Agent(provider, tools=[lookup_order]).as_tool("research", "Look up facts about orders.")
refunds = Agent(provider, tools=[issue_refund], config=AgentConfig(
    hooks=Hooks(before_tool=[require_approval("issue_refund")]),
)).as_tool("refunds", "Handle a refund request.", output_type=RefundOutcome)

lead = Agent(provider, tools=[research, refunds], config=AgentConfig(
    run_store=SQLiteRunStore("runs.db"),
    approver=SUSPEND,
    hooks=Hooks(before_tool=[deny_tools("close_account", reason="manual only")]),
    max_run_cost_usd=1.00,
))

The model calls refunds with a task; every call is a fresh child run with its own memory and audit chain, so the same agent tool can run several times in one turn. Delegation cannot escape the parent run:

• Approvals bubble up. When issue_refund asks for approval inside refunds, the lead run suspends and result.pending_approvals lists it as "<refunds call>/<issue_refund call>". lead.resume(run_id, approvals={that_id: True}) resumes the child and then the lead.
• One budget. Child spend counts toward the lead's max_run_cost_usd before its next model call and is included in total_cost_usd.
• Linked audit. The lead's tool_call event records the child's delegated_run_id and final delegated_root_hash, so tampering with a child chain shows from the parent. Child runs report to agent-kit Cloud as their own runs with parent_run_id.
• Crash-safe. A delegation interrupted by a crash resumes the child from its checkpoint.
• Parent policies match tool names, and they see the child's tools: allow_only(...) on a lead must list the child tools it permits, too. Nesting is limited by AgentConfig(max_delegation_depth=5).

For a fixed graph of agents, use DAGOrchestrator. Full example: examples/delegation.py.

---

Tool output scanning

Everything a tool returns — a web page, a document, an MCP result, a delegated agent's answer — lands in the model's context as if it were trustworthy. Screen it first:

from agent_kit.scanning import NullconeScanner, PatternScanner, scan_tool_output

agent = Agent(provider, tools=[fetch_page, research], config=AgentConfig(hooks=Hooks(after_tool=[
    scan_tool_output(
        PatternScanner(),                      # local rules, no network
        NullconeScanner(),                     # optional threat-intel lookups
        block_at="high", warn_at="medium",     # stop_run_at=... is also available
        trusted_tools=["lookup_order"],        # internal tools you don't need to screen
    ),
])))

The most severe finding decides what the model sees:

PatternScanner rules (disable any with disable=[...], add your own with extra_rules=[PatternRule(...)]):

Rules favour precision: tool output is full of ordinary prose, docs, and code, so everyday phrasing isn't flagged.

NullconeScanner checks URLs, domains, IPs, and hashes found in the output against the Nullcone threat database. It sends those indicators — never the output, never URL query strings or credentials — so treat it as data egress. Confidence filtering comes from the API (unverified and low-score hits are ignored by default); reserved names and private IPs are never looked up; answers are cached; it fails open on errors unless fail_closed=True, and pauses after HTTP 429.

Every decision with findings appends a tool_output_flagged audit event and reports it to agent-kit Cloud (rule, severity, JSON path, and matched indicator — no output text), where a tool_output_flagged alert rule with min_severity pages on-call. A lead agent's scanner also screens every delegated child's tool outputs. Any object with a name and an async scan(spans) -> list[Finding] method is a scanner. Full example: examples/scanned_tools.py; design: specs/17-tool-output-scanning.md.

---

MCP tools

Use tools from any Model Context Protocol server — pip install agent-kit-ai[mcp]:

from agent_kit.tools.mcp import MCPToolset, http, require_approval_unless_read_only, stdio

async with MCPToolset(
    stdio("fs", "npx", "-y", "@modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem", "/srv/docs"),
    http("linear", "https://mcp.linear.app/mcp", headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {key}"}),
) as mcp:
    agent = Agent(provider, tools=[*mcp.tools, my_tool], config=AgentConfig(
        hooks=Hooks(before_tool=[require_approval_unless_read_only(mcp)]),
        approver=approve,
    ))
    await agent.run("Summarise the onboarding docs and file a Linear issue for anything out of date")
# every server disconnected (subprocesses terminated) here

• MCP tools are ordinary agent-kit tools named server__tool: allowed_tools, hooks, approvals, budgets, audit, and Cloud reporting all apply.
• deny_tools("exec") and require_approval("exec") also match shell__exec on any server. allow_only matches exactly — list MCP tools by their full server__tool name, so an allowlist entry never admits a same-named tool from another server. A helper naming a tool the agent (or its child agents) doesn't have logs a warning at the first run.
• Structured results come back as data; text, images, and resources are summarised; tool errors and timeouts (call_timeout_s) reach the model as tool errors.
• require_approval_unless_read_only(mcp) asks before any MCP tool not marked readOnlyHint — a server can't skip the gate by omitting hints.
• A required server that fails to connect closes the others and raises MCPConnectionError; required=False skips it.

Full example: examples/mcp_tools.py.

---

Installation

# Core (Anthropic only)
pip install agent-kit-ai

# With OpenAI support
pip install agent-kit-ai[openai]

# With OpenTelemetry
pip install agent-kit-ai[otel]

# Everything
pip install agent-kit-ai[all]

---

agent-kit Cloud

Connect any agent to the agent-kit Cloud backend — fleet metrics, audit trail storage, alerting, budgets, and SLA context. There is no hosted service yet: run the server yourself (self-hosting guide) and point the SDK at it.

from agent_kit.cloud import CloudReporter

reporter = CloudReporter(
    api_key="akt_live_...",                          # or set AGENTKIT_API_KEY
    base_url="https://agentkit.internal.acme.com",   # your server, or set AGENTKIT_BASE_URL
    project="production",
    agent_name="billing-assistant",
)

agent = Agent(
    provider=AnthropicProvider(),
    config=AgentConfig(cloud=reporter),
)
result = await agent.run("Process this invoice.")
# Events are batched and shipped automatically — no await needed.

CloudReporter is fire-and-forget: network errors are logged at DEBUG level and never propagate to your agent. Performance is completely unaffected by cloud connectivity.

What gets reported

CloudReporter options

CloudReporter(
    api_key="akt_live_...",
    project="production",
    agent_name="billing-assistant",
    flush_interval_s=5.0,    # how often to batch-send (default 5s)
    max_queue_size=1000,     # drop events if queue exceeds this
    include_output=False,    # never ships LLM output text to cloud
)

See docs/cloud-quickstart.md to get started, or docs/self-hosting.md to run the backend yourself.

Stop runaway spend

reporter = CloudReporter(project="support", agent_name="support-bot")

agent = Agent(
    AnthropicProvider(),
    config=AgentConfig(
        cloud=reporter,
        max_run_cost_usd=2.00,   # per run, enforced locally
        enforce_budgets=True,    # fleet budgets defined in agent-kit Cloud
    ),
)

Budgets ($200/day for support-bot) live in agent-kit Cloud at /v1/budgets; when one trips, the next model call raises BudgetExceededError and a budget_exceeded alert fires. See docs/cloud-quickstart.md.

Caps fail closed: a model agent-kit has no price for raises UnpricedModelError rather than counting as $0.00. Price it once at startup — agent_kit.providers.set_price("ft:gpt-4.1:acme", 3.00, 12.00) (USD per million input / output tokens, longest prefix wins). Ollama models are free and need no price.

Already on another harness?

Keep it. Adapters report Claude Agent SDK and OpenAI Agents SDK runs — turns, tool calls, subagents, handoffs, guardrails, cost — to the same audit trail, fleet dashboard, and alerts. The audit chain is built on your machine, and nothing changes on the server:

# Claude Agent SDK — pip install agent-kit-ai[claude-agent-sdk]
from agent_kit.integrations.claude_agent_sdk import ClaudeAgentObserver

observer = ClaudeAgentObserver(CloudReporter(project="support"))
options = observer.with_hooks(ClaudeAgentOptions(allowed_tools=["Read", "Grep"]))
async for message in observer.observe(query(prompt=prompt, options=options), prompt=prompt):
    ...  # messages arrive unchanged

# OpenAI Agents SDK — pip install agent-kit-ai[openai-agents]
from agent_kit.integrations.openai_agents import AgentKitTraceProcessor

add_trace_processor(AgentKitTraceProcessor(CloudReporter(project="support")))

Runnable versions: examples/claude_agent_sdk_monitored.py, examples/openai_agents_monitored.py.

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License

Rising Sun License v1.0. Free for personal use. Commercial deployments connect to the Nous network.