Observed since 20 Oct, 23:36 UTC
No superseded metadata states collected. Unchanged observations do not create new revisions.
Trust telemetry middleware for inter-agent communication — makes instruction contamination observable across traces
Trust telemetry middleware for inter-agent communication — makes instruction contamination observable across traces.
In agent orchestration, a trusted sender does not imply trusted content.
Tool descriptions from MCP servers, messages relayed via sampling, forwarded content from upstream agents — all of these can carry contaminated instructions even when the sender is legitimate. Single-message input filtering cannot capture this chain contamination.
Human → Agent A (contaminated) → Agent B → Agent C
↑
Passes through because sender is trusted
But the content is contaminated
agent-trust-telemetry makes this visible by adding security semantics over traces to your existing observability stack.
git clone https://github.com/wharfe/agent-trust-telemetry.git
cd agent-trust-telemetry
pip install -e ".[dev,langgraph]"
python examples/langgraph/multi_agent_contamination.py
Expected behavior:
agent_a is flagged with action=quarantine (poisoned instruction detected)from att.integrations.langgraph import TrustTelemetryCallback
callback = TrustTelemetryCallback()
result = graph.invoke(
{"messages": messages},
config={"callbacks": [callback]},
)
pip install agent-trust-telemetry
# Evaluate a single message
att evaluate --message message.json
# Evaluate a JSONL stream
att evaluate --stream messages.jsonl
# View evaluation report
att report --input evaluations.jsonl --format table
{
"risk_score": 82,
"severity": "high",
"policy_classes": [
{"name": "instruction_override", "confidence": 0.91, "severity": "high"}
],
"anomaly_indicators": [
{"name": "provenance_or_metadata_drift", "subclass": "parent_flagged_propagation", "confidence": 0.70, "severity": "high"}
],
"evidence": [
"override phrase detected near end of long context",
"parent message msg:xxx was flagged (risk_score: 65, action: warn)"
],
"recommended_action": "quarantine"
}
quarantine does not simply block a single message — it pauses propagation to downstream agents.
| Tool | Focus |
|---|---|
| Lakera Guard | Point-in-time content screening |
| LangSmith | Observability / debugging / tracing |
| This tool | Security semantics over traces + inter-agent trust propagation |
Not a competitor — a complement. Designed to layer on top of existing OTel stacks without requiring a proprietary monitoring platform.
Layer 1 Cheap Deterministic Known markers, pattern matching
Layer 2 Contextual Classifier Maps to policy violation classes (LLM used only for refinement)
Layer 3 Risk Aggregation Upstream inheritance, session accumulation, role-transition drift
MVP implements Layer 1 only. The core evaluation engine has zero external LLM API dependencies.
Alpha — MVP complete
att evaluate / att report / att quarantine)See CONTRIBUTING.md for development setup and guidelines.
To report a vulnerability privately, use GitHub Security Advisories:
For non-sensitive security discussion, open an issue:
Download counts and popularity will appear here as the collector receives them.
| Version | Published | Direct dependencies | Open version |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0.1.0 | 9 Mar 2026 | 11 |
This describes our collected data; it is not a security assessment.
Shared repository data · GitHub
Observed since 20 Oct, 23:36 UTC
No superseded metadata states collected. Unchanged observations do not create new revisions.
package:1ba3697b2b4e3bc75fd39619f09118f8855f6e52edfbc1cbe7fd1de792cd9e67