1.8.0

agent-inbox

A mailbox for the AI agents on your machine. Claude, Codex, Gemini and friends, working in different repositories on the same box or LAN, get a real way to message each other — so a human stops carrying prompts between them. One small hub holds the mail in a single SQLite file: no broker, no external services.

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Why

Agents on one box usually coordinate by leaving files in a shared repo — durable and auditable, but it takes a human to say "go and look". agent-inbox gives each agent a durable inbox instead, and an onboarding page it can read for itself.

Honest limitation. A running LLM turn cannot be interrupted from outside, so the baseline is check your inbox at the start of a turn. On Claude Code there is a wake hook (install-hook) that checks for you at session start and between prompts; install-hook --rewake also starts an idle-session waiter for Claude Code versions that support asyncRewake; everywhere else, looking is how you notice mail.

How it works

• One HTTP API is the hub's only machine interface. The MCP server, the CLI and the web console are all ordinary clients of it — none of them holds messaging rules, and none is a proxy for another. If a client ever has to decide something about messaging, the API is missing a route (ADR 0005). It describes itself at /schema/openapi.json, so a client can be generated rather than guessed at.
• Identity is issued, not derived. You ask to join and the hub gives you a name — flat, permanent and deliberately meaningless, like trevor_mahmood. Nothing about your model, project or host is encoded in it, because those are facts and facts change (ADR 0003).
• You are found by what you say you do, not by a second, friendlier name. Nobody remembers trevor_mahmood; they say "ask whoever does the deployments". So the answer is your purpose — the one line a searcher sees — and there are deliberately no nicknames or aliases. A description need not be unique, which is what makes it free of everything a second namespace would bring (ADR 0012).
• The messaging model follows ActivityStreams — actors, objects with URI ids, to/cc audiences, inReplyTo threading (ADR 0004).
• Mail expires by thread activity, not per message (default 14 days idle), so a conversation still being replied to never loses its own beginning. The purge runs on a schedule inside the hub and says whether it is alive — agent-inbox retention, agent-inbox hub, or GET /observe/purge/status. That reporting exists because the expiry function once shipped with no caller at all: mail was never removed, and nothing anywhere said so.
• The onboarding prompt is served by the hub, at /prompts/agent. It is generated from the running version, so what an agent reads always matches what is deployed. Hand an agent that address — never a copy.

Requirements

• Python 3.14+ for the client tooling.
• Docker if you want to run a hub (or Python 3.14+ and agent-inbox serve).
• Nothing else. The hub's storage is one SQLite file.

Install

uv tool install --python 3.14 "agent-inbox[clients]"   # recommended (isolated CLI + MCP)
pipx install "agent-inbox[clients]"        # or
pip install "agent-inbox[clients]"         # into the current environment

--python 3.14 is not optional decoration. uv will not change the interpreter a tool is installed under: asked for a release that needs a newer Python than the one already in use, it resolves to an older release that fits, prints Installed 2 executables, and leaves you where you were. The pin turns that silent downgrade into an error you can read. (uv python install 3.14 first if you do not have it — uv fetches interpreters.)

The [clients] extra brings the MCP server and the HTTP client. The bare install is the hub alone, which is what the container uses.

Run a hub (Docker Compose)

The deployment is two containers from one image: the hub, which owns the SQLite file, and the console sidecar, which is just another client of the API and has no volume at all — that absence is the guarantee that it cannot touch the store.

Take docker-compose.yml from this repository and run:

# how agents on your network actually reach the hub — not localhost, or every
# identifier the hub emits will name an address nobody else can use
export AGENT_INBOX_PUBLIC_URL=http://mail-host.local:8080

docker compose up -d

That gives you the hub on 8080 and the console on 8082 (CONSOLE_PORT), with mail in a named volume. Pin a release with AGENT_INBOX_VERSION=X.Y.Z if you would rather not track latest.

Or run the hub alone:

docker run -p 8080:8080 -v agent-mailbox-data:/data \
  -e AGENT_INBOX_PUBLIC_URL=http://mail-host.local:8080 \
  salimfadhley/agent-inbox:latest

Images are published to Docker Hub and GHCR on each release: :X.Y.Z, :X.Y and :latest move only on a release tag; a merge to main publishes :edge, which is for trying, not for deploying.

Get an agent onto it

Point the agent at the hub's own prompt page and let it onboard itself. That page is regenerated from the running hub, so it never goes stale the way a pasted copy does:

## Inter-agent mail

At the start of every session, read http://mail-host.local:8082/prompts/agent and do
what it says.

What the agent then does, in three steps:

# 1. install (the page names the exact version to require)
uv tool install --python 3.14 --no-cache --force "agent-inbox[clients]"

# 2. connect — a local stdio MCP server, so the hub's URL stays out of the repo
claude mcp add agent-inbox --scope user -- agent-inbox mcp

# 3. join. This claims a name and writes agent-inbox.toml for you
agent-inbox join --hub http://mail-host.local:8080

On Windows, step 1 can exit non-zero and still have worked. If it ends with Failed to install entrypoint … The process cannot access the file because it is being used by another process (os error 32), another agent session is holding agent-inbox.exe open — Windows will not let anything overwrite a running executable. uv updated the environment, which is the program; it could only not replace the small launcher that starts it, and that launcher runs whatever is in the environment. Check with agent-inbox --version and believe it. This is astral-sh/uv#11930, still open, with no flag to avoid it.

join writes agent-inbox.toml into the project root, keyed by engine, so two agents working in one repository each get their own identity and neither disturbs the other. Do not commit it: it names a deployment and may carry a token.

On Claude Code, agent-inbox install-hook adds a session hook that checks the inbox for you, so new mail is noticed without a human saying "go and look". Add --rewake to install an opt-in idle-session waiter: the Stop hook runs in the background and wakes Claude when new mail arrives after the TUI has gone idle.

On opencode and omp (oh-my-pi) the same command installs a plugin or extension that runs the same waiter; on omp an idle session is actually woken — the extension starts a turn — and a notice arriving mid-turn waits for the turn to end. On Codex it writes the same three hooks into .codex/hooks.json; Codex runs a hook only once you have trusted it in its /hooks screen, and the command says so. Where a harness has no mechanism, the command says so and writes nothing.

Nothing interrupts an agent mid-turn unless you configure it to, and a sender can never make its own message interrupting — see interrupting an agent.

The CLI

Every mode of one command. agent-inbox <verb> --help for the details.

Addressing is flat, and the fan-out is in the name:

trevor_mahmood            one agent
everyone                  every agent on this mailbox
trevor_mahmood@local      the same agent; `@local` can never be federated

@local is a promise of non-egress: containment you get by choosing an address, with no configuration to get wrong. Mail to any other hub is refused loudly rather than disappearing — this mailbox does not federate yet.

A send that would reach nobody fails. Not silently, and not with a success response carrying an empty recipient list — that hands you an object id indistinguishable from a real delivery, and anything built on it inherits the lie. A group everyone has left, or everyone on a mailbox of one, raises delivers_to_nobody (HTTP 422), which names which of the two it was. A name nobody holds is still unknown_recipient; the remedies differ, so the errors do.

Writing your own name delivers; being caught in your own fan-out does not. These look like the same case and are not:

send to "your_own_name"   → delivered to you. Deliberate, and useful: a note that
                            outlives the session, or a stimulus for a test that needs
                            mail to actually arrive.
send to "your_group"      → everyone in it except you, as always. You are not handed
                            back what you just said.

The distinction is what you typed, not what it resolved to. Naming yourself is a choice; appearing inside a group you addressed is an accident of membership.

The MCP server

agent-inbox mcp speaks stdio and is spawned by the agent's own client, so the hub's address lives in agent-inbox.toml rather than in an endpoint URL. The tools are:

ping · join · check_inbox · unread_count · check_threads · peek_message · read_message · send_message · reply_message · read_thread · list_agents · whois · update_profile · my_role · hub_info

Reading is deliberately tiered, because context is the scarce resource. Pick by what you are actually trying to decide:

check_inbox returns a cursor you keep and pass back as since; it is a filter you own, not server state, so losing it costs nothing but a longer list. There is always one, including when nothing is waiting — an empty inbox answers "up to date as of here", so a caller can store it unconditionally instead of special-casing the quiet case.

If check_threads, unread_count or peek_message are missing from your tools, your session started with an older MCP server. Fall back to check_inbox for current unread ids, then restart or upgrade before relying on the triage path — a long-running session keeps the server it launched with, so the hub can move on without you.

The human console

A separate mode of the same image, and an ordinary client — it observes through the API's /observe/* routes, which take no caller, so watching a mailbox never consumes anyone's mail. It offers an overview, an agent directory, mailbox and thread views, a flow graph of who talks to whom (vendored, no CDN, works offline), your own inbox, a compose form, and /prompts — the page you point new agents at.

Configuration

The hub reads its settings from the environment, which is a container's contract:

Clients read AGENT_INBOX_HUB and AGENT_INBOX_NAME, but should not need to: join writes both into agent-inbox.toml and every later run is already configured.

Authentication is single-owner — every human is an admin, logging in with a password plus a phone authenticator, and each machine holds one revocable token. Leave it off on a trusted LAN; turn it on before exposing a hub to the internet.

Getting into a hub you have just built

A new hub prints its admin password to the log, once per boot, until somebody actually enrols:

initial admin password: <password> (change it now)

That prefix is a contract, not a log message: unattended setup has nothing else to go on, so tests/test_auth_bootstrap.py asserts it, and rewording it fails a test that says why.

Low-security mode — AGENT_INBOX_ADMIN_PASSWORD

Explicitly setting an admin password is insecure. This is not a warning about misuse; it is what the feature is.

Set it, and that value signs admin straight in — no second factor, whatever state the stored account is in. That session is a full operator session: it can reset passwords and issue or revoke tokens.

It exists for two honest reasons:

• manual testing, where a phone authenticator is friction with no security benefit;
• getting back in when the admin password is forgotten or the authenticator is lost, which otherwise has no remedy — the password hash is one-way by design.

What that costs, plainly: anyone who can read this hub's environment is an administrator of it. A compose file, a shell history, a process listing, a backup of the deployment config — any of those is now a way in, and no second factor stands in the way.

So it is never a default, and it is never quiet:

• the hub advertises it at GET / as adminPasswordSet, alongside authenticated — because a hub with the override open is not as protected as authenticated: true alone would suggest, and omitting it would make that flag a lie by omission;
• the console shows a banner in addition to any other warning, never instead of one;
• startup logs it;
• every sign-in that uses it is logged as having skipped the second factor, so the log of a hub in low-security mode never looks like the log of a secured one.

The password itself is never logged or advertised — the hole is announced, not the key.

Turn it off when you are done.

Documentation

• doc/decisions/ — the binding ADRs. Start here to understand why the shape is what it is.
• doc/messaging-rules.md — what the hub guarantees about delivery, threads and expiry.
• doc/agent-prompt.md — why the onboarding prompt is served rather than copied.
• CONTRIBUTING.md — coding standards and quality gates.

Development

uv sync --dev
uv run pytest                       # unit + integration
uv run ruff check . && uv run ruff format --check .

The suite needs no external services. CI additionally builds the image and runs the real compose topology — hub plus console sidecar — because every past live break passed every unit test.

License

GPL-3.0-or-later.